Civil Procedure by Joseph, Jack & Duban, Janice
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 21
Issue 2 Winter 1990 1988-89 Illinois Law Survey Article 5
1990
Civil Procedure
Jack Joseph
Partner, Joseph and Myers, Chicago, IL
Janice Duban
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jack Joseph, & Janice Duban, Civil Procedure, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 241 (1990).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol21/iss2/5
Civil Procedure
Jack Joseph * and Janice Duban**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 242
II. INTERPLAY OF THE CODE AND RULES: SECTIONS
2-611 AND 2-611.1 AND NEW RULES 137
AND 375 ........................................... 243
A. Introduction and Background .................. 243
B. Case Survey: Section 2-611 .................... 246
III. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL ............................ 249
A. Introduction ............................ 249
B. Effect of Pending Defense Motion .............. 250
C. When Does Trial Commence? .................. 251
D. Reinstatement After Dismissal .................. 252
IV. REFILING AFTER INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL ....... 254
A . Introduction ................................... 254
B. Dismissal by Federal Court ..................... 254
C. Dismissal by Court of Claims .................. 257
D. Due Diligence in Service of Process ............. 258
V. POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS .................... 259
A. Supplementary Proceedings ..................... 259
B. Relief From Judgment ......................... 262
VI. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ........................... 263
A. Effect of Suing Deceased Defendant ............ 263
B. Actions for Contribution ........................ 265
C. Relation Back of Amendments ................. 267
VII. CERTIFICATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS: CONSTITUTIONALITY .................... 268
VIII. DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WITNESSES ................ 270
A . Introduction ................................... 270
B. Treating Physicians ............................ 271
C. Co-workers and Employees ..................... 273
• Partner, Joseph and Myers, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1949, University of Chicago;
J.D., 1952, University of Chicago.
** B.A., 1975, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. candidate, 1991, Loyola
University of Chicago.
Loyola University Law Journal
IX. LEGISLATION ...................................... 274
A. Changes to the Code of Civil Procedure ........ 274
1. Section 2-209: "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction ... 274
2. Section 2-411: Capacity of Partnerships to
Sue in Their Own Name ................... 275
3. Section 2-402: Expansion of Respondent in
Discovery to All Civil Actions ............. 276
4. Section 2-607: Bills of Particulars .......... 276
5. Section 8-2601: Minors' Out-of-Court
Statem ents ................................. 277
6. Section 9-111: Condominium Assessment
C laim s ..................................... 277
7. Section 12-101: Judgment Liens ........... 278
8. Section 15-1507: Foreclosure Sales ......... 278
B. Changes to the Supreme Court Rules ........... 278
1. Rule 3: Rules Committee Practice &
Procedure ................................. 278
2. Rule 23: Disposition of Appellate Cases .. 279
3. Rule 105: Additional Relief Against
Defaulted Parties ......................... 279
4. Rule 137: Sanctions for Bad Faith
Filings .................................... 279
5. Rule 201: Discovery ...................... 279
6. Rule 204(c): Depositions of Physicians ... 280
7. Rule 224: Pre-Suit Discovery ............. 280
8. Rule 296: Enforcement of Support
O rders .................................... 280
9. Rule 304(a): Appeals of Final Judgments
that Do Not Dispose of Entire
Proceedings ............................... 281
10. Rule 307: Interlocutory Appeals as of
R ight ..................................... 281
11. Rule 310: Appellate Prehearing
Conferences ............................... 281
12. Rule 375: Sanctions for Bad-Faith
Appellate Filings .......................... 282
X . CONCLUSION ...................................... 282
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors of this Article have reviewed significant develop-
ments in Illinois civil procedure during the approximate period
from June 1988 through June 1989. In some sense, virtually every
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case decided, every statute enacted and every rule promulgated af-
fects practice and procedure. Given the limitations of time and
space, no treatment of this nature could be exhaustive, and this one
is not intended to be. Moreover, it is to be recognized that the
selection of cases, rules and statutes, as well as the lessons to be
drawn from them, are to some extent subjective and that no two
authors would be likely to make the same choices or to emphasize
the same aspects of the material. We have used our best judgment
to select and discuss the developments we believe will most affect,
and most assist, the practitioner who litigates in the courts of the
State of Illinois.
Civil procedure was not revised systematically during this Sur-
vey period. There were no comprehensive statutory reenactments,
wholesale revisions of rules or all-encompassing judicial decisions.
Changes are interstitial, and of varying importance, and as a result,
description of them may seem episodic. Although we have tried to
make the discussion self-contained, we probably have assumed at
least some background knowledge by the reader, to whom we hope
we are rendering a service.
II. INTERPLAY OF THE CODE AND RULES: SECTIONS 2-611
AND 2-611.1 AND NEW RULES 137 AND 375
A. Introduction and Background
Perhaps the most dramatic development of the Survey period
was the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of Rules 1371 and 3752
that provide, respectively, for the imposition of sanctions upon par-
ties in the state's trial and reviewing courts for frivolous actions,
i.e., those not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by law,
and those interposed for an improper purpose. These rules became
effective August 1, 1989.
Rule 137 supersedes section 2-611 of the Code.3 As described
below, Rule 137 repeats the language of section 2-611 with three
significant changes.4 One obvious purpose of adopting the Rule
1. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective August
1, 1989).
2. Id. para. 375.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987). See ILL. S. Cr. R. 137, 1989 Ill.
Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (committee comments). The Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, chapter 110 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, is referred to hereinafter as both
the "Code" and the "Code of Civil Procedure."
4. Section 2-611 remains on the statute book, but is of no effect and should be re-
pealed. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that when a statute and court rule gov-
erning procedure conflict, the rule takes precedence. People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274,
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was to effectuate these changes. Another possible purpose is that
the court may have believed section 2-611 to be unconstitutional.
The court may have viewed section 2-611 as an impermissible leg-
islative attempt to regulate the practice of law, a field that the court
considers within its exclusive province.5
The General Assembly adopted section 2-611 in its present form
in 1984 as part of the Tort Reform Act.6 Medical and insurance
groups had advocated vigorously the Act's adoption to reduce friv-
olous litigation.7 Some members of plaintiffs' bar viewed these ef-
forts as an attempt to curtail all litigation, frivolous or not. The
Act adopted almost verbatim the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 118 and was intended to incorporate the federal courts'
interpretations of that Rule.9
Capsulizing a great deal of complicated law into one sentence,
Rule 11 and section 2-611 were intended to impose sanctions upon
both the litigant and the attorney who filed a pleading or other
document that was (1) not reasonably grounded in fact, (2) not
warranted in law or (3) imposed for an improper purpose. Each
one of these three prongs has become almost talismanic. Merely
cataloguing conduct, however, does not alert the bar to sanction-
able conduct; indeed, great differences among the federal judges in
applying the statute have been noted and strongly criticized. 10 The
412 N.E.2d 541, 545 (1980). For an anomalous decision by a downstate appellate court,
see Woerner v. Seneca Petroleum, Inc., 175 111. App. 3d 329, 529 N.E.2d 660 (3d Dist.
1988), which decided that the ability of corporations to handle small claims pro se was
governed by section 2-614 of the Code, rather than by the conflicting provisions of Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 282(b), because the statute was enacted first. Id. at 331, 529 N.E.2d
at 662. On the specific subject, see Burr and Price, A Brief Note About A Small Claim,
ILL. B.J., April, 1988, at 414.
5. E.g., Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 66 Ill. 2d 398, 401, 362 N.E.2d 1047, 1048
(1977) ("It is for this court to determine who shall be permitted to practice law in
Illinois.")
6. An "Act in Relation to the Insurance Crises," 1984 Ill. Laws, P.A. 84-1431 (effec-
tive November 25, 1986) (codified at scattered sections of ILL. REV. STAT.).
7. Section 2-611.1 was adopted at the urging of medical and insurance interests for
medical malpractice cases arising prior to the adoption of the current section 2-611. It
contains provisions substantially similar to those contained in section 2-611 prior to its
amendment to its current form in 1986. The section, if it was ever used, fell into disuse
with the enactment of present section 2-611. Although it is not specifically covered by
the committee comments to Rule 137, it would appear that it, too, is superseded by Rule
137, that it is not viable law and that it is ripe for repeal.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
9. See, e.g., Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Anderson, 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 621-22, 532
N.E.2d 595, 599 (1st Dist. 1988); Joseph, Rule 11 Makes Its Mark in Illinois, CBA Rec-
ord, N6v. 1988, at 23.
10. The federal rule has been criticized as fostering hostility among the bar, creating
instead of reducing litigation, impairing the function of attorneys as representatives of
244 [Vol. 21
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federal courts in the Seventh Circuit have been, and continue to be,
particularly stringent in their application of Rule 11. 11
Rule 137 makes three principal changes, two of which are very
significant for the practicing bar.' 2 The most important change is
the substitution of the word "may" for the word "shall" with re-
gard to the imposition of sanctions. Federal Rule 11 requires (and
superseded section 2-611 required) that, once the offending con-
duct has been found to exist, sanctions must be imposed. 3 Rule
137 makes the imposition of sanctions discretionary. It has been
said that state judges were much more reluctant to impose sanc-
tions than federal judges, in part because the latter have lifetime
appointments, whereas the former must run for re-election.' 4 Rule
137 makes it easier for an Illinois judge to refrain from sanctioning
parties and attorneys who may vote or campaign for or against the
judge. On the whole, this change is probably for the better because
sanctions should be imposed only in the exceptional case.
Another significant change is that Rule 137 requires a judge who
imposes sanctions to make specific findings supporting the order.
This, too, is a salutory provision that will likely discourage a judge
from imposing sanctions. The imposition of sanctions reflects
upon an attorney's reputation and integrity; consequently, their
imposition should be based on explicit findings from which a re-
viewing court can better determine whether error has been
committed.
their clients, providing an illegitimate device to permit judges to clear their calendars and
intimidating litigants from filing meritorious claims or defenses in fear of sanctions. See
generally Margolick, Has the Profession's Attempt to Curb Ludicrous Litigation Boomer-
anged?, The New York Times, February 11, 1988, at 13; Elson and Rothschild, Rule 11:
Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 365 (1989) ("Another product of the sanc-
tions explosion is the erosion of civility."); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1013, 1018 (1988) ("The avalanche of rule 11 cases... carries with it the potential
for increased tension among the parties and with the court. Sanction proceedings can
affect personal relations, making it more difficult to conduct the litigation in a rational
manner and reach accommodation.")
11. For the latest comprehensive review of the Seventh Circuit's attitude, see Mars
Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
12. The third change removes special provisions in section 2-611 relating to insurance
companies. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective
August 1, 1989).
13. E.g., Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir.
1987).
14. See generally Joseph, supra note 9, at 23.
15. In Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988), the court
identified Rule 11 violations as a species of negligence or malpractice. Id. It is not out of
place to remind practitioners that, when charged with a violation, the attorney's profes-
sional liability carrier should be notified.
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Although Rule 137 has an effective date of August 1, 1989, the
Rule does not explicitly provide for retroactive application. Thus,
uncertainty as to its application has arisen. One view is that con-
duct prior to the effective date is governed by section 2-611 because
rights established under that section of the Code are vested. Yet,
sanctionable conduct that begins before the effective date but con-
tinues thereafter raises additional problems. The Rule 137 require-
ment of specific findings seems to be procedural, and perhaps it
should apply without regard to the time at which the conduct
arose. The former compulsory imposition of sanctions standard,
however, would seem to militate against this conclusion.
Some cases cast doubt on the application of section 2-611 (and,
for that matter, Federal Rule 11) to appeals.1 6 Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 37517 may make that controversy moot because it con-
tains separate provisions for frivolous appeals.
Problems under section 2-611 are somewhat ameliorated by new
Rules 137 and 375. Practitioners, however, should not relax their
guard, because they are still subject to sanctions for factually
groundless, legally unwarranted or improperly interposed matters.
Attorneys still must be concerned about conflicts of interest with
their clients," possible substantial liability, and opprobrium that
may be cast upon them. As a result, an attorney might become
somewhat less of an advocate, and somewhat more of a policeman,
with respect to his or her clients.
B. Case Survey: Section 2-61119
In Re Estate of Wernick2 ° was decided under the "old" section
2-611, which provided an "untrue pleading" standard as the basis
16. E.g., Holcomb v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 840, 848-49, 536
N.E.2d 453, 458 (2d Dist. 1989).
17. ILL. S. CT. R. 375, 1989 Il. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective August
1, 1989). The standards under Rule 375 parallel those in Rule 137 applying to the trial
court.
18. See Joseph, supra note 9, at 26-27.
19. Various section 2-611 decisions were rendered during the Survey period.
Unfortunately, many of them do not clarify whether they were decided under the original
version of the statute (1982 Ill. Laws, P.A. 82-280, effective July 1, 1982) or under the
current version (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987) (amended by 1986 Ill. Laws,
P.A. 84-1431, effective November 25, 1986)). The statute's original incarnation provided
for the imposition of sanctions on those who filed untrue pleadings; the current statutory
standard is less rigid and, as discussed previously, covers pleadings that are "after
reasonable inquiry . .. [not] well grounded in fact [or] warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, [or are]
interposed for any improper purpose .... " Id.
20. 127 Ill. 2d 61, 535 N.E.2d 876 (1989).
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for sanctions. The trial court had declined to impose sanctions,
but the appellate court reversed. The supreme court, emphasizing
the penal nature of the statute, the burden on the party seeking the
sanctions to support them and the inconsequential nature of the
only two untrue statements in respondent's pleading, reversed the
appellate court on this point.21
In Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Anderson,2 the trial
court had imposed sanctions upon a mortgagor and his attorney
because of a failure to make a reasonable factual inquiry to support
the denial of a default. The case was decided under the current
version of section 2-611 and serves as a good research tool because
it sets out the section's history as well as applicable standards.23
Declining to apply the federal appellate standards, the court indi-
cated that it would "adhere to Illinois precedent applying the
abuse of discretion standard. ' 24 This case reminds attorneys that
they do have an obligation to file subsequent pleadings that correct
the mistake, i.e., they cannot stand silent, even though if they learn
an allegation made in a pleading they have filed is false, they are
not obligated to correct the pleading.
In a case applying the present version of section 2-611, Herman
v. Fitzgerald,25 the court decided when a section 2-611 petition may
be filed. In this case, the section 2-611 petitioner had served notice
within thirty days of the final judgment but had not filed within
that time. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
found that the filing was untimely and affirmed the dismissal of the
section 2-611 petition. 26 Unfortunately, the court's discussion cites
cases decided under the former version of section 2-611, with that
version's more rigid standards, to bolster what appears to be the
correct result.
Wren v. Feeney2 I resulted in an unfortunate, two to one decision
that affirmed the imposition of sanctions upon plaintiff's attorney
for his failure to determine that the applicable statute of limitations
barred his client's cause of action in a medical malpractice case.29
21. Id. at 82, 535 N.E.2d at 889.
22. 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 532 N.E.2d 595 (1st Dist. 1988).
23. Id. at 623-24, 532 N.E.2d at 600 (The standards, adopted from federal Rule 11,
are objective, and require a pre-filing factual inquiry beyond an attorney's reliance on his
client.)
24. Id. at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 601.
25. 178 Ill. App. 3d 865, 533 N.E.2d 1144 (2d Dist. 1989).
26. Id. at 869, 533 N.E.2d at 1147.
27. Id., 533 N.E.2d at 1146.
28. 176 Ill. App. 3d 364, 531 N.E.2d 155 (3d Dist. 1988).
29. Id. at 365-66, 531 N.E.2d at 156.
1990]
Loyola University Law Journal
This decision seems incorrect in principle. The dissenting judge
pointed out, in vain, that the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense that a defendant may or may not raise; it does not consti-
tute anything unreasonably grounded in the complaint for which
sanctions may be imposed. 0
In Palmisano v. Connell,31 the court reaffirmed the principle
that, under the current version of section 2-611, requests for sanc-
tions may be made only in the underlying litigation.3 2 The court
further held that an unresolved section 2-611 petition is, in effect,
an unresolved claim between the parties that prevents an appeal
from an otherwise final underlying judgment.33 The court in In Re
Marriage of Strauss 4 followed the Palmisano rule by dismissing
the appeal from a section 2-611 claim. The court suggested, how-
ever, that a Rule 304(a) 35 finding of "no just reason" might support
an appeal on this issue when other issues remain unresolved.36
In Lee v. Egan, 7 the trial court had ruled that defendant was
entitled to attorneys' fees for vexatious litigation under the former
version of section 2-611. On review, the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District noted that on a prior appeal, defendant had
not raised the section 2-611 issue and she had not requested a re-
mand for the imposition of additional sanctions; consequently, the
court ruled that defendant waived her right to additional sanc-
tions.38 This decision serves as a warning that the successful sec-
tion 2-611 petitioner, when defending an award on appeal, should
also request the reviewing court to remand the case for the imposi-
tion of additional costs incurred in defending an unreasonable ap-
peal or invoke the provisions of Rule 375.39
30. Id. at 366, 531 N.E.2d at 156 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
31. 179 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 534 N.E.2d 1243 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 115
(1989).
32. Id. at 1095, 534 N.E.2d at 1247.
33. Id. The court affirmed the trial court's 2-611 ruling on the merits because the
appellant had failed to provide a sufficient record on appeal. Counsel should be aware of
the possible trap involved in Palmisano. Should a different district court or the supreme
court take the contrary position, a notice of appeal filed after resolution of the section 2-
611 dispute would be untimely.
34. 183 Ill. App. 3d 424, 539 N.E.2d 808 (2d Dist. 1989).
35. ILL. S. Cr. R. 304(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 304(a) (1987) (governing
discretionary appeals from orders which do not dispose of the entire proceedings). A
Survey period amendment to Rule 304(a) is discussed infra notes 293-95 and accompany-
ing text.
36. 183 Ill. App. 3d at 431, 539 N.E.2d at 813.
37. 184 Ill. App. 3d 852, 540 N.E.2d 955 (1st Dist. 1989).
38. Id. at 854, 540 N.E.2d at 957.
39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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The court in Safeway Insurance Co. v. Graham 40 held that the
present version of section 2-611 would not be applied retroactively.
Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School 41 made the same point with
respect to the former version of the statute, holding that the section
must be construed strictly. Further, because the statute applied
only to pleadings, statements contained in a letter or those made in
open court were not sanctionable.42
The holding in Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Armstrong43 stands
for the important proposition that section 2-611 does not apply to
cases in which sanctions may be imposed for abuse of discovery
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219." The decision also em-
phasized that the statute must be stricty construed and that a peti-
tion under the statute must allege specifically the conduct charged
to be wrongful and the damages incurred. The petitioner carries
the burden of proof.45
Because the language of Rule 137 is, with the exceptions noted,
exactly the same as section 2-611 that it supersedes, the decisions
interpreting section 2-611 should govern interpretation of Rule 137
as well.
III. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
A. Introduction
Section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure" permits
a plaintiff, counterclaimant or third-party plaintiff to dismiss vol-
untarily all or part of a pending lawsuit without prejudice at any
time before trial or hearing begins. Although at one time section 2-
1009 had been interpreted to provide the plaintiff with an almost
absolute right to dismiss, decisions in the pre-Survey period began
to recognize exceptions.47 During the Survey period, the Illinois
Supreme Court decided a significant case that extended the trend
to eliminate the statute's abusive use.48 In addition, Illinois appel-
40. 188 Ill. App. 3d 608, 544 N.E.2d 1117 (1st Dist. 1989).
41. 176 Ill. App. 3d 886, 531 N.E.2d 941 (1st Dist. 1988).
42. Id. at 897, 531 N.E.2d at 948. The words of the statute itself do not limit liability
to pleadings, but rather to all "fflings." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
43. 176 I1. App. 3d 64, 530 N.E.2d 1041 (1st Dist. 1988).
44. ILL. S. Cr. R. 219, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 219 (1987).
45. 176 Ill. App. 3d at 71-2, 530 N.E.2d at 1041.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).
47. See infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text. The courts responded in part to
vigorous criticism-largely by the defense bar-that the section was being abused.
48. Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989), discussed infra
notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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late courts defined the scope of the meaning "before trial" within
section 2-100949 and, in certain circumstances, refused reinstate-
ment after voluntary dismissal.50
B. Effect of Pending Defense Motion
In Gibellina v. Handley,51 the Illinois Supreme Court announced
a new rule that limits a plaintiff's right to dismiss his case volunta-
rily: A trial court may now hear and decide a potentially disposi-
tive motion filed by a defendant prior to the filing by a plaintiff of a
section 2-1009 motion, when defendant's motion, if favorably ruled
upon by the court, could result in final disposition of the case.
Gibellina involved the consolidation of three cases52 with the fol-
lowing common procedural history. In each case, plaintiff filed a
motion for voluntary dismissal after defendant had filed a motion
for summary judgment, but before the court had ruled upon the
motion. In each case, the trial court granted the defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion and denied the plaintiff's motion for volun-
tary dismissal. The appellate court reversed in each instance,
holding that the trial court had no discretion to hear and decide
summary judgment motions before granting motions for voluntary
dismissal. 3 The supreme court affirmed.
In so doing, the court noted that plaintiffs were flooding the
courts with abusive section 2-1009 motions to delay and avoid ad-
verse rulings. Consequently, the court announced the new rule for
prospective application only.54 The court reasoned that retroactive
application would have imposed an unfair burden on the present
litigants.5  The court admonished the legislature56 for its failure to
49. Cummings v. Simmons, 167 Il. App. 3d 544, 521 N.E.2d 634 (4th Dist. 1988),
discussed infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
50. Johnson v. Sumner, 172 Ill. App. 3d 70, 526 N.E.2d 690 (3d Dist. 1988), dis-
cussed infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
51. 127 Il. 2d at 137-38, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
52. Gibellina v. Handley, 158 Ill. App. 3d 866, 511 N.E.2d 884 (2d Dist. 1987);
Schmitt v. Motorola, Inc., 160 111. App. 3d 1059, 513 N.E.2d 1069 (1st Dist. 1987); Ware
v. Jabaay, 161 Ill. App. 3d 1160, 526 N.E.2d 1148 (2d Dist. 1987) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
53. 127 Ill. 2d at 125, 535 N.E.2d at 860. Although each case involved the plaintiff's
dilatory conduct in disclosing trial experts as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
220, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220 (1987), the egregiousness of each plaintiff's
conduct varied. Nevertheless, each plaintiff had been barred from presenting expert testi-
mony at trial, and each court had granted summary judgment based upon the respective
plaintiff's inability to prove some element of his case absent expert testimony. Id.
54. Id. at 137-38, 535 N.E.2d at 866. The change was prospective because it consti-
tuted a clear departure from prior precedent on this issue.
55. Id. The court declined defendants-appellants' invitation to displace section 2-
1009 completely by adopting the voluntary dismissal provision of the Federal Rules of
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act to curb perceived section 2-1009 abuses, and asserted its own
authority to manage the courts.57
The announced change substantially modifies the historical pri-
ority given section 2-1009 motions over dispositive defense mo-
tions. Before deciding the section 2-1009 motion, a trial court may
now decide all defense motions filed prior to the section 2-1009
motion that may dispose of one or more causes of action.58 Be-
cause a trial court has discretion as to which motion it will hear
first, the defendant's right to have a potentially dispositive motion
heard before the section 2-1009 motion is limited. The Gibellina
court suggested, however, that this discretion may be limited to
instances in which the defense motion is without merit. 59 The sug-
gestion seems problematical because it is quite likely that if a de-
fense motion has no merit, in most cases plaintiff would have no
incentive to dismiss.
Plaintiffs' attorneys cannot risk an adverse ruling that would dis-
pose of their clients' case on the merits. This change in the law,
therefore, makes it extremely important to respond promptly to
summary judgment motions and other motions that may dispose
the case. It also necessitates a prompt and thorough investigation
of each case as quickly as possible. Plaintiff no longer has an unre-
strained option of voluntary dismissal as a means of obtaining
more time to complete additional discovery, locate experts or pre-
pare affidavits in response to motions for summary judgment.
C. When Does Trial Commence?
Section 2-1009 grants to plaintiff the right to dismiss its case vol-
untarily only "before trial or hearing begins."' In Cummings v.
Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a). The federal rule permits a plaintiff to take a
voluntary dismissal as of right only before the defendant files an answer or motion for
summary judgment. Id.
56. See Kahle v. John Deere Co., 104 Il1. 2d 302, 472 N.E.2d 787 (1984), in which
the court also noted the abusive utilization of section 2-1009 and suggested that the legis-
lature amend the statute to prevent such abuse. Id. at 310-11, 472 N.E.2d at 791 (Ryan,
J., concurring). In Kahle, the supreme court affirmed an order granting the plaintiff's
motion for voluntary dismissal that had been filed after the trial court had ruled on vari-
ous motions in limine on the date set for trial. The court held that arguments and rulings
on pretrial motions did not constitute the commencement of trial. Id. at 310, 472 N.E.2d
at 790. Thus, the plaintiff's statutory right to dismiss voluntarily could not be denied in
this instance. Id. The subject of "when trial commences" for purposes of voluntary dis-
missal analysis is further discussed infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
57. Gibellina, 127 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
58. Id. at 137-38, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
59. Id. at 138, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).
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Simmons,6 1 the Illinois Court for the Fourth District addressed the
issue of when a trial has begun for purposes of section 2-1009 anal-
ysis. Four jurors had been sworn in after having been examined by
the court and the attorneys for the parties. The trial court then
recessed until the following day. On the following day, plaintiff
moved for and was granted a voluntary dismissal of his entire case
before further jury examination began.62 Defendant appealed, con-
tending that the swearing in of four jurors constituted the com-
mencement of trial. The court agreed and reversed.63 Admitting
that the question of whether four jurors constituted "a jury" for
purposes of section 2-1009 analysis was one of first impression in
Illinois, the court relied upon Kahle v. John Deere Co.64 to avoid
reaching the issue of whether a jury existed. The court stated that
the Kahle rationale required a conclusion that trial begins as soon
as any prospective jurors are examined.65 Practical considerations
mandated this ruling. If the court had reached the opposite result,
the potential for abuse would have approached the same magni-
tude as under pre-Code law.6
D. Reinstatement After Dismissal
In Johnson v. Sumner,6 7 the third district held that a trial court
has no jurisdiction to reinstate, pursuant to section 2-1203(a),68
counts of a complaint previously voluntarily dismissed, unless the
plaintiff had also sought and obtained leave to set aside the dismis-
sal at the time of its entry. Sumner was a medical malpractice case
brought against two physicians and a hospital. Plaintiff's appeal of
the summary judgment entered in favor of the hospital was pend-
ing. Although no leave to reinstate had been requested, the day
after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all counts against the doctors,
he successfully petitioned the court to vacate the dismissal and re-
61. 167 Ill. App. 3d 544, 521 N.E.2d 634 (4th Dist. 1988).
62. Id. at 546, 521 N.E.2d at 635.
63. Id. at 549, 521 N.E.2d at 637.
64. 104 Ill. 2d 302, 472 N.E.2d 787 (1984), discussed supra at note 56.
65. Cummings, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 548, 521 N.E.2d at 637. In Kahle, the court stated
"no jury had been selected; no propspective jurors had been sworn; and counsel had made
no opening statement. Under the law in effect in this state, trial had not begun." Kahle,
104 Ill. 2d at 309, 472 N.E.2d at 790.
66. At common law, a plaintiff was permitted to take a non-suit at any time prior to
the entry of a decision by the judge or the jury. See Kahle, 104 Ill. 2d at 307, 472 N.E.2d
at 789.
67. 172 Ill. App. 3d 70, 526 N.E.2d 690 (3d Dist. 1988).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1203(a) (1987). The statute provides that a
party may petition a court to modify or vacate a judgment within thirty days after its
entry.
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instate the counts against the doctors.69
The appellate court reversed, relying on one70 of a line of Illinois
cases applying the "Weisguth rule, '"I" in which the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that although a court may set aside an involuntary
dismissal and reinstate the cause, it has no power to do so follow-
ing voluntary dismissal unless, at the time of the dismissal, plaintiff
seeks and obtains leave to reinstate at a later time.'2 The modem
authority for the Weisguth rule is Bettenhausen v. Guenther.'3
Justice Stouder, in his concurring opinion in Johnson v. Sum-
ner,74 sees weaknesses in the Weisguth opinion, and in Bet-
tenhausen's reliance upon Weisguth. First, the voluntary dismissal
in Weisguth was sought after the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-
in-chief at trial. The present statute 5 would preclude voluntary
dismissal under these circumstances.' 6 Second, the Weisguth court
offered no discussion of why personal jurisdiction over parties
should be lost after voluntary, but not after involuntary, dismis-
sal.77 Third, the decision lacked a much-needed discussion of the
courts' unqualified authority to deal with their judgments for thirty
days following entry.'8
Modem courts' reliance on the Weisguth rule may be unsupport-
able and should be reexamined, especially in view of its recurring
significance to practitioners. Not infrequently, cases are settled
just prior to a scheduled pre-trial or trial date. Although a settle-
ment may have been agreed upon, it is often not consummated
prior to the court date. Unwary plaintiffs' attorneys, in an effort to
avoid the time and expense of an additional court appearance, may
69. Johnson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 526 N.E.2d at 691.
70. Herman v. Swisher, 115 Ill. App. 3d 179, 450 N.E.2d 28 (3d Dist. 1983).
71. Weisguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 272 Ill. 541, 112 N.E. 350 (1916), super-
seded by statute as stated in Kalalnick v. Knoll, 97 Ill. App. 3d 660, 422 N.E.2d 1011 (1st
Dist. 1981).
72. Id. at 543, 112 N.E. at 351. The court expressed the following reason for the
Weisguth rule:
If a plaintiff by his deliberate and voluntary acts secures the dismissal of his
suit, he must be held to have anticipated the effect and necessary results of his
action, and should not be restored to the position and rights which he volunta-
rily abandoned. Having taken a non-suit, his only recourse is to begin his action
anew.
Id. Cases citing the Weisguth rule are noted in Johnson v. United Nat'l Indus. Inc., 126
Ill. App. 3d 181, 466 N.E.2d 1177 (1st Dist. 1984).
73. 388 Ill. 487, 58 N.E.2d 550 (1944).
74. 172 Ill. App. 3d 70, 526 N.E.2d 690 (3d Dist. 1988) (Stouder, J. concurring).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).
76. Johnson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 73, 526 N.E.2d at 692 (Stouder, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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voluntarily dismiss the case on the court date based upon their set-
tlement expectations. Any order so obtained must expressly pro-
vide that the court retains jurisdiction over the case, or that the
plaintiff is given leave to move to vacate the order and have the
cause reinstated. Otherwise, under present law if the settlement
agreement is not consummated, the plaintiff's only recourse is to
refile.
IV. REFILING AFTER INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
A. Introduction '
Essentially, Section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure79 permits an action upon which the statute of limitations has
run to be refiled within one year after it is voluntarily dismissed,
involuntarily dismissed for want of prosecution, or involuntarily
dismissed by a federal court for lack of jurisdiction.8" This fallback
protection generates the perceived abuse of the statutory right to
dismiss voluntarily,8 which Illinois courts are now curtailing. 82
The courts, however, have not similarly curtailed the utilization of
section 13-217 to refile involuntarily-dismissed suits.
B. Dismissal by Federal Court
In Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp. ,83 the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the provision of section 13-217 that permits refil-
ing within one year following dismissal by a federal district court
for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the one-year period
runs from the date of dismissal, not from the date of the reviewing
court's affirmance."
Plaintiff first filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois in May
1980 ("the 1980 case"), in which she alleged that the defendants'
trading of various stock options, on behalf of her late husband,
violated federal securities laws. The court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action was barred by the
applicable three-year limitations period. 5 In May 1981, plaintiff
filed a second complaint in district court ("the 1981 case") based
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987).
80. See id.
81. Id. para. 2-1009.
82. See e.g., supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text.
83. 128 Il. 2d 314, 538 N.E.2d 553 (1989).
84. Id. at 320-21, 538 N.E.2d at 556.
85. Id. at 316, 538 N.E.2d at 554. The district court found that, there being no appli-
cable federal statute of limitations in this case, section 13(d) of the Illinois Securities Law
of 1953 applied. Id. (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, para. 137.13(D) (1977)).
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upon the same factual allegations made in the 1980 case.86 The
court dismissed the 1981 case on the same grounds as the 1980
case, this time without prejudice and with leave to amend.87
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in June 1982, adding a
count based on common law fraud. The district court dismissed
the amended complaint on December 30, 1982 because the federal
securities law claims were time-barred, and thus the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to retain the pendent state fraud claim.
The court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.8
A week after the court dismissed the amended complaint, plain-
tiff filed another complaint based on common law fraud in the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County, Illinois ("the 1982 case").8 9 The
circuit court dismissed this case on two grounds: (1) the complaint
was not timely served, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
103(b), 9 and (2) section 2-619(a)(3)91 barred the action because the
1981 case involving the same subject matter was pending between
the parties in the Seventh Circuit.92
Plaintiff refiled the present action in the circuit court in Novem-
ber 1984 based upon the same facts and legal grounds as the 1982
action. On defendants' motion, the court dismissed the complaint
as barred by the applicable five-year limitations period. The appel-
late court reversed, holding that section 13-217 tolled the limita-
tions period to permit the timely filing of the present action on
either of two bases. The court reasoned that plaintiff could have
refiled within one year of the Seventh Circuit's affirmance (in Au-
gust 1984) of the 1981 case's dismissal. Alternatively, plaintiff
could have refiled within one year of the 1982 state case's dismissal
(in December 1983). 93
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that section 13-
217 did not save the plaintiff's action on either of the alternative
86. The 1981 case additionally alleged that defendants should be estopped to assert
the limitations defense.
87. 128 Ill. 2d at 316-17, 538 N.E.2d at 554.
88. Id. at 318, 538 N.E.2d at 555.
89. Id.
90. ILL. S. CT. R. 103(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 103(b) (1987). The court
determined, apparently on the basis of an unclear record, that the dismissal was without
prejudice as to Rule 103(b) grounds. 128 Ill. 2d at 318, 538 N.E.2d at 555.
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619(a)(3) (1987). This section identifies various
grounds upon which a defendant may seek dismissal, including the existence of another
action pending between the parties for the same cause.
92. Suslick, 128 Il1. 2d at 318, 538 N.E.2d at 555.
93. Id. at 319-20, 538 N.E.2d at 555-56.
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bases relied upon by the appellate court.94 The court stated that
the one-year period for refiling commences from the date of a dis-
trict court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 5 The date of the
dismissal's affirmance does not control. 6 The court further stated
that the dismissal of the 1982 case did not give rise to a right to
refile under section 13-217.97 It reasoned that, even if the dismissal
had been without prejudice on the 103(b) ground, the dismissal
based upon section 2-619(a)(3) constituted a dismissal with preju-
dice, not the type of dismissal embraced by section 13-217.98
Moreover, even assuming the dismissal of the 1982 case could be
construed as giving rise to a right to refile, the court held that the
time for refiling nevertheless had expired one year after the dismis-
sal of the 1981 case. The court explained that only one type of
section 13-217 dismissal can serve as the predicate for refiling.99
Therefore, the dismissal of the 1981 case represented plaintiff's
sole opportunity to refile.1°°
A one-year refiling provision that begins to run from the dismis-
sal date may place the plaintiff between a rock and a hard place.
Suslick implies that a plaintiff must choose between appealing an
adverse federal jurisdictional ruling and filing a state court action.
Furthermore, the decision is inconsistent as to when an action on
appeal in federal court is "pending" for section 2-619(a)(3) pur-
poses. In one part of the opinion, the court suggests that the 1981
case was not still pending at the time it was on appeal."°" The
94. Id. at 321-22, 538 N.E.2d at 556.
95. Id. at 320, 538 N.E.2d at 556. The court considered the dismissal date of the
1981 case to be August 2, 1983, the date upon which the district court denied the plain-
tiff's motion for reconsideration. Id. at 320-21, 538 N.E.2d at 556.
96. Id. at 320, 538 N.E.2d at 556.
97. Id. at 321, 538 N.E.2d at 556.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 321-22, 538 N.E.2d at 557.
100. The court cited its 1988 decision in Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338, 518
N.E.2d 1051 (1988), as support for the proposition that only one dismissal can be the
grounds for refiling under section 13-217. Suslick appears to extend the Gendek holding.
In Gendek, the court held that only one voluntary dismissal can serve as the predicate for
refiling under section 13-217. Id. at 343-4, 518 N.E.2d at 1053. Suslick, on the other
hand, declared that only one dismissal of any type, either voluntary or involuntary, may
give rise to the right to refile under section 13-217.
101. Suslick, 128 Ill. 2d at 320, 538 N.E.2d at 556. In discussing its holding that the
date of dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction triggered the right to refile, the court
stated that:
[I]t cannot reasonably be argued that, following the dismissal of the plaintiff's
Federal action by the district court . . . the action was still 'pending' in that
court.... Simply because the defendants ... erroneously represented to that
court that their action was still pending in Federal court does not mean that the
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court ascribes no error, however, to the circuit court's dismissal of
the 1982 case on section 2-619(a)(3) grounds. Although plaintiff
may have failed to raise this issue on appeal, the court should not
have relied sub silentio on an erroneous dismissal to reach its hold-
ing, thereby leaving the law in a state of confusion.
C. Dismissal by Court of Claims
In Edwards v. Safer Foundation, Inc.,1°2 the appellate court ex-
panded the coverage of section 13-217 to include claims dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction by the Illinois Court of Claims after the
applicable statute of limitations has run. Plaintiff had improperly
filed a personal injury lawsuit in the Illinois Court of Claims
against the Illinois Department of Corrections and Safer, the pri-
vate owner of a halfway house in which plaintiff resided.1 3 The
court of claims dismissed the claim against Safer for lack of juris-
diction. 10 4 Plaintiff refiled the suit against Safer in the Cook
County Circuit Court, pursuant to section 13-217, within one year
of the dismissal. On the defendant's motion, the trial court dis-
missed the suit on the grounds that section 13-217 did not apply to
dismissals by the court of claims. 1 5 Absent the tolling provision
afforded by section 13-217, the applicable statute of limitations
barred the complaint. 'I
Applying the principle that section 13-217 must be construed
liberally in order to further its remedial purpose, the appellate
court reversed. 0 7 Although section 13-217 does not refer expressly
to actions dismissed by the court of claims, the appellate court held
that the statute's language demonstrated a legislative scheme to
broaden its application. 08 The court concluded that the remedial
policy of section 13-217 renders the section applicable to any statu-
tory cause of action that creates remedies subject to time con-
limitations period under section 13-217 is extended to the date of the affirmance
of the dismissal by the Federal Court of appeals.
Id.
102. 171 Ill. App. 3d 793, 525 N.E.2d 987 (1st Dist. 1988).
103. Id. at 794-95, 525 N.E.2d at 988.
104. Id. Safer, a private party, was not amenable to suit in the court of claims. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (1987). The court dismissed the claim against the
State on other grounds. 171 Ill. App. 3d at 795, 525 N.E.2d at 988.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 798, 525 N.E.2d at 990.
108. Id. The language referred to is " '[i]n any of the actions specified in any of the
sections of this act or any other act or in any contract where the time of commencement of
any action is limited .... '" Id. at 797, 525 N.E.2d at 989-990 (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987)) (emphasis added by court).
1990]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
straints, including the act upon which plaintiff originally premised
his claim. 109
The Illinois courts have previously employed similar reasoning
to permit the refiling of claims arising under the Probate Act, 1 0
the Wrongful Death Act"' and the Paternity Act." 2 The broad
language in the Edwards decision" 3 is especially noteworthy be-
cause it apparently was unnecessary to resolve the specific issue
before the court.
C. Due Diligence in Service of Process
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Erickson "4
signals a slight retreat from its consistent attack on the permissive
interplay between Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b)' and sec-
tion 13-217. The attack, which began with the court's decision in
O'Connell v. St. Francis,"6 was prompted because section 13-217
permits dilatory plaintiffs to circumvent Rule 103(b) sanctions by
refiling within one year of dismissal. 'I Martinez involved two fac-
tually related medical malpractice lawsuits, each filed by the same
plaintiff within one day of the expiration of the applicable statutesX
109. 171 Ill. App. at 798, 525 N.E.2d at 990. The plaintiff's claim was premised on
the Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.1 (1987).
110. See In Re Estate of Breault, 113 Ill. App. 2d 356, 251 N.E.2d 910 (1st Dist.
1969).
111. See Kristan v. Belmont Community Hosp., 51 Ill. App. 3d 523, 366 N.E.2d
1068 (1st Dist. 1977).
112. See People ex rel. L'Minggio v. Parker, 65 Ill. App. 3d 296, 382 N.E.2d 613 (1st
Dist. 1978).
113. Edwards, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 798, 525 N.E.2d at 990 ("whether a legislative
remedy is created under [various acts] or the Court of Claims Act, 'or any other act,' we
hold that the remedial policy of section 13-217 applies and [plaintiff] must be permitted
to refile his claim...").
114. 127 Ill. 2d 112, 535 N.E.2d 853 (1989).
115. ILL. S. CT. R. 103(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 103(b) (1987). Rule
103(b) permits a court, either sua sponte or upon the defendant's motion, to dismiss a case
for the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service on the
defendant.
116. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986) (holding that a court must consider and
rule upon a pending 103(b) motion before ruling upon a plaintiff's motion to dismiss
voluntarily and stating that in considering a 103(b) motion in a case refiled pursuant to
section 13-217, the court may consider the plaintiff's diligence in effecting service in the
original suit).
117. Subsequently, the court has retroactively applied the principles it articulated in
O'Connell, and it has applied these principles to cases in which the defendant was served
for the first time in the refiled action. See Catlett v. Novak, 116 Ill. 2d 63, 506 N.E.2d
586 (1987). It has also applied the O'Connell principles to cases refiled following involun-
tary dismissal. See Muskat v. Steinberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988) (suit
refiled after dismissal for want of prosecution).
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of limitations." 8 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the first case nine
months after he filed it. The court dismissed the second case for
want of prosecution seven months after it was filed. In neither case
had the plaintiff even attempted to effect service of process on any
defendant. "19
Plaintiff then refiled a single action against all defendants and
served the defendants within three weeks of the refiling date. 20
Relying on O'Connell and on plaintiff's lack of diligence in ob-
taining service in the previously dismissed suits, the trial court
granted several defendants' Rule 103(b) motions to dismiss. The
appellate court reversed, ruling that O'Connell should apply pro-
spectively.' 2' After determining that its decision in Muskat v.
Steinberg 22 was dispositive and that O'Connell operated retroac-
tively, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. 23 The court also re-
manded, concluding that the trial court may have afforded
excessive weight to plaintiff's service efforts in the original cases
and inadequate weight to those efforts in the refiled case. 124 The
court stressed that a trial court "cannot disregard obvious dili-
gence on the part of the plaintiff in effecting service after
refiling."'' 25
Of course, plaintiffs who fail to effect service promptly ought not
rely on Martinez to save their refiled suits from dismissal under
Rule 103(b). The totality of the circumstances continues to deter-
mine the issue of diligence. 26  After Martinez, however, a trial
court apparently has no discretion to ignore a plaintiff's diligence
in effecting service after refiling.
V. POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
A. Supplementary Proceedings
In Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc.,27 the Illinois Supreme
Court was called upon to define the precise effect of the restraining
118. Martinez v. Erickson, 127 I11. 2d 112, 113, 535 N.E.2d 853, 854 (1989).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 113-14, 535 N.E.2d at 854.
121. Id. at 115, 535 N.E.2d at 854.
122. 122 Ill. 2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988). Muskat was decided shortly after the
appellate court had reached its decision. In Muskat, the supreme court expressly af-
firmed the retroactive application of the O'Connell holding, although it already had ap-
plied it retroactively in Catlett. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123. Martinez, 127 I11. 2d at 120, 535 N.E.2d at 857.
124. Id. at 121-22, 535 N.E.2d at 857-858.
125. Id. at 122, 535 N.E.2d at 858.
126. Id.
127. 126 Ill. 2d 307, 533 N.E.2d 1080 (1989).
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provisions often contained in citations to discover assets. 128  In
Bank of Aspen, the citee argued that the restraining provisions of
the citation constituted an injunction and should be treated as such
for the purposes of section 11-110 of the Code. 12 9 Furthermore,
the citee argued, to the extent section 2-1402 permits the inclusion
of restraining provisions in the citation, it is unconstitutional, be-
cause the restraining provisions are imposed without notice, with-
out an immediate post-seizure hearing and without the posting of
bond. 3 0
The supreme court rejected both of the citee's contentions. The
court held that the restraining provisions sanctioned by section 2-
1402 do not constitute an injunction.1 3 1 Citing the joint committee
comments on section 2-1402,132 the court held that the citation
merely constitutes notice to the citee that if he violates the cita-
tion's restraining provisions, he risks entry of a money judgment
against him, or a criminal contempt citation. 33 The court noted
that the citee is not prohibited from transferring property other
than that belonging to the judgment debtor.134  Therefore, if the
citee is sufficiently confident that property in his possession is not
"property of the judgment debtor," he is free to transfer that prop-
erty notwithstanding service of the citation. 35
128. Citations to discover assets are commonly served by judgment creditors upon
judgment debtors or third parties who the judgment creditor believes may be indebted to
the judgment debtor. Pursuant to the provisions of section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a citation to discover assets is the pleading which commences a supplemen-
tary proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402 (1987). Typically, the clerk of
court issues the citation, on a pre-printed form, for service on the judgment debtor or
third party (the citee). The form contains language prohibiting the citee from making or
allowing any transfer or other disposition of property belonging to the judgment debtor
or otherwise disposing of any money due to the judgment debtor, until further order of
the court, or termination of the supplementary proceedings. The citation usually pro-
vides that the citee's failure to comply with the citation's restraining provisions may sub-
ject the citee to punishment for contempt or to a judgment for the unpaid balance of the
debtor's judgment. Section 2-1402 specifically authorizes the inclusion of this language in
the citation. Id. para. 2-1402(d)(1).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 11-110 (1987). This section entitles an enjoined
party to recover damages it sustains as a result of a wrongfully issued temporary re-
straining order or preliminary injunction. Id. Whether the citation constitutes an injunc-
tion also affects the right of a party aggrieved by the issuance of the citation to an
interlocutory appeal as a matter of right under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1).
ILL. S. CT. R. 307(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 307(a)(1) (1987).
130. 126 Ill. 2d at 312-13, 533 N.E.2d at 1082-83.
131. Id. at 315, 533 N.E.2d at 1083.
132. Id. at 314, 533 N.E.2d at 1083 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402,
joint committee comments at 862 (Smith-Hurd 1983)).
133. Id. at 314, 533 N.E.2d at 1083.
134. Id. at 316, 533 N.E.2d at 1084.
135. Id.
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The court also held that the restraining provisions authorized by
section 2-1402 are not unconstitutional."a6 In so ruling, the court
noted that the service of a citation containing restraining language
is not a "pre-judgment seizure" because citations issue only after
judgment is entered against the judgment debtor.13 7 Moreover,
citees are afforded, in any event, an opportunity to obtain an imme-
diate hearing to determine ownership or possessory rights in prop-
erty that appears to be subject to the citation. 3 8  The court
reiterated that a citee who disposes of property covered by a cita-
tion, believing in good faith that the property does not belong to
the judgment debtor, could not be punished for contempt but
would be liable to the judgment creditor solely for the value of the
judgment debtor's property transferred.3 9
In characterizing a citation's restraining provisions as mere no-
tice to the citee of possible penalties in the event of a violation, the
court left unresolved whether the restraining provisions are potent
enough to constitute the imposition of a lien. Some previous deci-
sions have held that the service of a citation does precisely that by
creating a judicial lien on the covered property in favor of the judg-
ment creditor.140 Others have disagreed.' 4' An argument could be
made that the Bank of Aspen characterization of a citation as mere
notice supports the proposition that no judicial lien attaches to
property by virtue of its being subject to citation proceedings. A
cogent response to this potential argument is that the existence of a
lien in favor of another does not prevent the owner or possessor of
that property from disposing of it. The lien encumbers the prop-
erty and merely follows it into the hands of a third party, though it
does not prevent the physical transfer of the property. Needless to
136. Id. at 323, 533 N.E.2d at 1087.
137. Id. at 318-19, 533 N.E.2d at 1085.
138. Id. at 322, 533 N.E.2d at 1087.
139. Id. at 320-21, 533 N.E.2d at 1086.
140. See, e.g., Asher v. United States, 570 F.2d 682, 683 (7th Cir. 1978) (instituting a
proceeding to discover assets under [now, § 2-1402] creates a judicial lien against intangi-
ble personal property); accord In Re Foluke, 38 B.R. 298, 301 (West) (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1984).
141. See, e.g., Kaiser-Ducette Corp. v. Chicago-Joliet Livestock, 86 111. App. 3d 216,
407 N.E.2d 1149 (3d Dist. 1980) (although a citation proceeding must be instituted to
obtain intangible property, a judicial lien is not created against either intangible or tangi-
ble personal property unless a writ of execution is delivered to the sheriff). Accord Bar-
nett v. Stem, 93 B.R. 962 (West) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). These decisions fail to note
section 2-1501 of the Code, which abolishes writs of execution. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1501 (1987). They also do not seem justified in principle because the service of a
citation (which must recite the facts with respect to a judgment) provides all the notice
and serves all the functions that the service of a writ of execution would serve. To require
a plaintiff to make two services in order to obtain a lien has no evident purpose.
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say, questions of adequate notice and fairness to a transferee are
raised. It may be that a transferee for fair value without actual or
constructive notice of the judgment creditor's rights should be
treated differently from other transferees.
B. Relief From Judgment
In addition to addressing issues raised by judgment enforcement
proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court also considered circum-
stances under which a judgment could be set aside. The court in
Kaput v. Hoey 14 2 rejected several procedural arguments made by a
defendant who sought the reversal of his section 2-1401143 peti-
tion's dismissal. Defendant had filed a pro se appearance to the
complaint, which sought "in excess of $15,000" in damages for
personal injuries the plaintiff sustained when he allegedly slipped
on the defendant's icy sidewalk.'" Because defendant never an-
swered or otherwise pleaded to the complaint, plaintiff obtained a
default judgment against him on January 28, 1983. On May 14,
1984, the court entered orders setting the matter for prove-up of
damages and dismissing the case for want of prosecution.145 The
record indicated that the dismissal had been inadvertent and had
been vacated by the trial court with the waiver of costs on June 1,
1984. Following the prove up, the court entered judgment against
defendant for $29,500 plus costs. 14
After he had been served in August 1985 with a citation to dis-
cover assets, defendant appeared through counsel and petitioned
the court to vacate the judgment pursuant to section 2-1401. De-
fendant argued, inter alia, that his failure to receive notice of the
default entry rendered the judgment void, that plaintiff was re-
quired, but failed, to provide him with notice of both the reinstate-
ment following dismissal and the prove-up on damages, and that
plaintiff was required, but failed, to provide notice that he sought
damages in excess of the ad damnum in his complaint.'47 The trial
court rejected these arguments and dismissed the petition to va-
142. 124 IlN. 2d 370, 530 N.E.2d 230 (1988).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1987). The section provides a compre-
hensive method by which a party may seek relief from judgments, orders and decrees
more than thirty days after their entry.
144. Kaput, 124 Ill. 2d at 374, 381, 530 N.E.2d at 232, 235.
145. Id. at 374, 530 N.E.2d at 232.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 380, 530 N.E.2d at 234-235. As required by section 2-1401, the defendant
also alleged a meritorious defense to the claim. Id. at 385, 530 N.E.2d at 237. Both the
trial and reviewing courts, however, held that the defense was legally insufficient. Id.
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cate. The appellate court affirmed and the supreme court granted
defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
The supreme court affirmed, first rejecting the argument that
failure to receive notice invalidates a default order.1 4  The then-
existing version of the applicable notice provision expressly stated
that failure to give notice did not "impair the force, validity or
effect of the [default] order."' 149 Relying on Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 104(b), 150 the supreme court also rejected the argument that
the defendant was entitled to notice of either the reinstatement fol-
lowing involuntary dismissal or of the hearing on damages.'"
Rule 104(b) deprives defaulted parties of entitlement to notice of
subsequent proceedings. 52
Finally, the supreme court held that on the facts of this case, a
judgment of $29,500 could not be deemed to have "surprised" the
defendant enough to trigger the notice requirements of section 2-
604 of the Code of Civil Procedure'5 3 and Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 105(a).' 5 4 The provisions, whose combined purpose is to
avoid surprise to a defendant, require a plaintiff to give notice to a
defaulted defendant when relief is sought beyond that requested in
the complaint. 55 In this case, the nature of the claim, and the fact
that the plaintiff had requested damages in his complaint "in excess
of $15,000," defeated the argument that the amount of the final
judgment fairly warranted notice. 5 6
VI. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A. Effect of Suing Deceased Defendant
In Vaughn v. Speaker,57 none of several sections of the Code
saved the plaintiffs' complaint from the time bar of the applicable
148. Id. at 379, 530 N.E.2d at 234.
149. Id. at 378-79, 530 N.E.2d 234 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1302(a)
(1983)). The present version of the section, although transferring the obligation to pro-
vide notice of default from the clerk to the moving party, continues to provide that lack
of notice does not invalidate the default. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1302 (1987).
150. ILL. S. CT. R. 104(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 104(b) (1987). The rule
requires parties to file certificates of court papers's service only on those parties "who
have appeared and have not theretofore been found ... to be in default .... Id.
151. 124 Ill. 2d at 380, 530 N.E.2d at 234-35.
152. Id. at 380, 530 N.E.2d at 235.
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-604 (1987).
154. ILL. S. CT. R. 105(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 105(a) (1987).
155. 124 Ill. 2d at 381, 530 N.E.2d at 235.
156. Id. at 382, 530 N.E.2d at 235. The court noted, however, that the amount of a
default judgment obtained without notice under an open-ended prayer for relief is not
limitless. Id.
157. 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3218 (1989).
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statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed a personal injury action a few
days before the two-year statute of limitations15" expired. After
unsuccessfully attempting service after the statute had run, plain-
tiffs discovered that the named defendant had died ten months ear-
lier. They then obtained approval "to correct misnomer," filed a
second complaint stating the same allegations against the co-execu-
tors of the decedent's estate, and served them. The trial court
granted the executors' motion to dismiss, holding that the second
complaint was time-barred.' 59 The appellate court agreed."
The supreme court affirmed,' 61 rejecting several statutory argu-
ments advanced by plaintiffs. First, section 13-209 of the Code' 62
extends the time limitation for bringing actions against parties who
die before the expiration of the otherwise applicable time limit to
six months after letters of office issue in the decedent's estate.
Plaintiffs, however, had filed their second complaint ten months
after letters of office had issued.
Second, the court found that a plain reading of section 2-
1008(b) 63 revealed its inapplicability to the present situation. 16
The section permits the substitution of a living party for one who
has died. Yet, the term "party" clearly encompasses only individu-
als over whom the court already has jurisdiction in a pending ac-
tion. 65 Decedent, having never been served, was not a party for
whom his co-executors could be substituted. Similarly, the court
held that the provision of the Code applicable to correcting misno-
mers of parties 66 encompasses only the naming of the right party
by the wrong name. 167 Plaintiffs in this case intentionally sued de-
cedent, the wrong party, instead of his estate. Finally, the court
rejected the argument that section 2-616(d) 68 operates to save the
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202 (1987).
159. 126 Ill. 2d at 155, 533 N.E.2d at 887.
160. Id. The appellate court also found, however, that an issue of fact existed as to
whether the defendants were estopped to assert a limitations defense. Id. at 156, 533
N.E.2d at 887. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
161. 126 Ill. 2d at 167, 533 N.E.2d at 892.
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-209 (1987).
163. Id. para. 2-1008(b).
164. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d at 158, 533 N.E.2d at 888.
165. Id.
166. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-401(b) (1987). The section provides in part
that misnaming a party "is not a ground for dismissal but the name of any party may be
corrected at any time, before or after judgment, on motion, upon any terms and proof
that the court requires." Id.
167. 126 Ill. 2d at 158, 533 N.E.2d at 888.
168. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d) (1987) (pertaining to the amendment of
pleadings and their relation back to the originals).
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second complaint by allowing its relation back to the first.'69
There was no indication that the estate executors knew that a com-
plaint had been filed prior to the expiration of the two-year limita-
tion period. Absent notice to the prospective defendants, the
second complaint cannot relate back to the date on which the first
was filed.'10
Although it held that the statute of limitations barred the com-
plaint, the court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether conduct of the decedent's insurer "lull[ed] plaintiffs into
delaying their initial filing of suit" by causing them to believe mis-
takenly that their claim would be settled.171 Under such circum-
stances, the doctrine of equitable estoppel might preclude
defendants from asserting the limitations defense. In so holding,
the court articulated a standard for determining the existence of
detrimental reliance, one of the elements of the doctrine. 172 Reli-
ance is detrimental when it plays "a substantial part, and so [is] a
substantial factor, in influencing [a] decision."'' 7 3
The 86th General Assembly attempted to remedy the lacuna in
the statutes, highlighted by the decision in Vaughn v. Speaker, by
amending section 13-209 of the Code. 7 Public Act 86-793 17 al-
lows a plaintiff who commences an action without knowledge that
defendant is deceased to substitute a personal representative as de-
fendant, provided plaintiff proceeds with diligence to file an
amended complaint and to serve process on such representative. 7 6
B. Actions for Contribution
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District squarely has
held that third-party actions for contribution based upon medical
169. 126 Ill. 2d at 160, 533 N.E.2d at 889.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 166-67, 533 N.E.2d at 892.
172. Id. at 165, 533 N.E.2d at 891. The court also discussed the doctrine's other five
elements. Id. at 162-63, 533 N.E.2d at 890 (misrepresentation or concealment of material
facts, knowledge of truth by party making misrepresentation, lack of knowledge of truth
by party asserting estoppel, expectation of reliance and actual reliance).
173. Id. at 165, 533 N.E.2d at 891 (indicating that the standard is also set forth in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section 546, comment b (1977)).
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-209 (1987). This section essentially permits a
cause of action to be brought by or filed against a deceased party's representative. Id.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
175. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv., P.A. 86-793 at 3724 (West) (effective January 1, 1990).
176. Unfortunately, the General Assembly amended the Probate Act of 1975, P.A.
86-815, 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 3789 (West) (effective September 7, 1989), in part incon-
sistently with P.A. 86-793. The effect of inconsistent legislation passed during the same
session of the General Assembly is a subject beyond this Article's scope.
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malpractice are subject to the limitations period governing medical
malpractice actions,177 rather than the period governing actions
brought under the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.
171
In Heneghan v. Sekula, 79 the trial court dismissed as time-barred
defendant-doctor's third-party complaint for contribution against
two doctors and a hospital. The appellate court affirmed, holding
that the trial court properly had applied the four-year medical mal-
practice repose statute8 0 to appellant's contribution action.I8'
The court reasoned that certain established rules of statutory
construction required this result. First, Illinois case law requires
that particularized statutes must prevail over more general ones
dealing with the same subject.8 2 The malpractice statute of repose
was narrower and more specific than the contribution statute of
limitation,'8 3 even though the contribution limitations statute had
been enacted more recently.8 4 Second, absent a definition of the
word "action" in the malpractice statute, the courts must give the
word its ordinary and popular meaning.8 5 Thus constrained, the
court could not accept appellant's argument that the word "ac-
tion" in section 13-212186 encompassed only certain actions and
excluded contribution actions. 8 7 Third, proper statutory construc-
tion mandates the presumption that an express exception in a stat-
ute excludes all other exceptions.' Because the malpractice
statute of repose expressly excludes only actions to which section
177. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1987). This section is a statute of
limitations and repose. It requires medical malpractice actions to be brought within two
years of the date upon which the claimant discovers the injury, but it precludes the filing
of any such action more than four years from the date of the act or omission upon which
the claim is premised. Id. The section excepts from coverage actions that are concealed
fraudulently from the claimant. See id. para. 13-215.
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 301 (1987). Section 13-204 of the Act contains
the applicable limitation period: "No action for contribution among joint tortfeasors
shall be commenced with respect to any payment made in excess of a party's pro rata
share more than 2 years after the party seeking contribution has made such payment
towards discharge of his or her liability." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-204 (1987).
179. 181 Ill. App. 3d 238, 536 N.E.2d 963 (1st Dist. 1989).
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1987); see generally supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
181. 181 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 536 N.E.2d at 968.
182. Id. at 241, 536 N.E.2d at 965.
183. Id. at 242, 536 N.E.2d at 966.
184. Id. at 243, 536 N.E.2d at 967.
185. Id. at 242, 536 N.E.2d at 966.
186. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1987).
187. 181 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 536 N.E.2d at 966.
188. Id. at 243, 536 N.E.2d at 966.
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13-215 applies, 8 9 the court concluded that the legislature did not
intend to exempt contribution or any other actions from its
coverage. ' 90
Though the language of section 13-212 required the dismissal of
the contribution action, the court concurred with appellant's con-
cern that the court's holding operates to contravene the purpose of
the Contribution Act. The Act reflects the General Assembly's
concern that liability for wrongs should be shared equitably. 91 To
the extent that the court's decision forecloses meritorious contribu-
tion claims on procedural grounds, 192 it is inconsistent with this
purpose. Nevertheless, the court stated that the legislature, not the
courts, must act to obviate these concerns. 1
9 3
C. Relation Back of Amendments
In a medical malpractice action, the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Third District addressed whether a plaintiff's amended com-
plaint escaped the limitations time bar by relating back to the origi-
nal complaint. In Siebert v. Cahill, 94 the original complaint
alleged the defendant's negligence in puncturing plaintiff's tibial
artery during surgery in January 1984. 95 Plaintiff timely filed the
complaint within the four-year repose period. 96 Plaintiff's
amended complaint alleged negligence solely in the defendant's ini-
tial treatment of the same injury. This initial treatment occurred
eighteen months before the surgery, and more than four years
before the amended complaint was filed. The amended complaint
contained no facts concerning the surgical treatment. 97
In affirming dismissal of the amended complaint, the court re-
189. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-215 (1987); see generally supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
190. 181 Ill. App. 3d at 243, 536 N.E.2d at 967.
191. Id. at 245, 536 N.E.2d at 968.
192. Id. When a plaintiff discovers his injury within the repose period and does not
file his action until very near its expiration, the defendant may not learn of his own
contribution claim early enough to file on time. Id.
193. Id. at 246, 536 N.E.2d at 968. It would seem that the 1984 supreme court deci-
sion in Laue v. Leifheit, 105 Ill.2d 191, 473 N.E.2d 939 (1984), requiring that a contribu-
tion claim be brought in the action originally filed by the plaintiff, serves to reduce the
severity of this problem.
194. 173 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549, 527 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (3d Dist.), appeal denied, 535
N.E.2d 411 (1988).
195. Id. at 547, 527 N.E.2d at 1043.
196. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1987) and supra note 177. Appar-
ently, the plaintiff also filed the action within two years of his discovery of his injuries, for
the defendant did not raise this issue.
197. 173 Ill. App. 3d at 547, 527 N.E.2d at 1043.
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jected plaintiff's argument that because all of defendant's treat-
ment of the same injury constituted a single transaction, the cause
of action did not accrue until the completion of treatment. 19 Con-
sequently, the court ruled that because the amended complaint re-
lated "to a [sic] entirely different occurrence or procedure than the
original complaint," it failed to provide the defendant with "all the
information necessary to prepare the defense" to the amended
complaint. 199 The court concluded that because the amended com-
plaint introduced a new cause of action that did not relate back to
that of the original complaint, it constituted a new suit for statute
of limitations purposes.2 °
The opinion does not disclose the exact nature of defendant's
pre-surgical treatment, and it is possible that plaintiff may have
been able, through more artful pleading, to have included in his
amended complaint the events set forth in the original complaint
so as to describe the physician's treatment as one continuous pro-
cess. As pleaded in this case, however, the court was able to find
the treatment alleged in the first pleading discrete from that in the
amended pleading because the allegations in the latter were unre-
lated to the former.
VII. CERTIFICATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS:
CONSTITUTIONALITY
In an important case that the Illinois Supreme Court agreed to
review, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District declared
unconstitutional section 2-62221 of the Code of Civil Procedure.10 2
Section 2-622 implements stringent prerequisites to the filing of
medical malpractice suits. Section 2-622 provides that, prior to fil-
ing suit, plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney must attach to the com-
plaint both an affidavit stating that a health professional has been
198. Id.
199. Id. at 548, 527 N.E.2d at 1044. The presence of this information in the prior
pleading is a prerequisite to invoking the relation-back doctrine embodied in section 2-
616(b) of the Code. Id.
200. Id. at 549, 527 N.E.2d at 1044-45.
201. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-622 (1987).
202. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 184 Ill. App. 3d 802, 540 N.E.2d 847 (lst
Dist.), appeal granted, 545 N.E.2d 107 (1989). The DeLuna court expressly rejected the
second district's reasoning in upholding the constitutionality of section 2-622. See Bloom
v. Guth, 164 Ill. App. 3d 475, 517 N.E.2d 1154 (2d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 121 Ill. 2d
567, 526 N.E.2d 827 (1988). The third and fourth districts have followed Bloom. See
Sakovich v. Dodt, 174 Ill. App. 3d 649, 529 N.E.2d 258 (3d Dist. 1988), appeal denied,
124 Ill.2d 562, 535 N.E.2d 921 (1989); Alford v. Phipps, 169 111. App. 3d 845, 523
N.E.2d 563 (4th Dist. 1988).
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consulted and has determined that reasonable and meritorious
cause exists for filing the action and the actual report of the profes-
sional indicating the basis for the determination. °3 Although the
section extends the time to fulfill its requirements under certain
circumstances, °4 it authorizes dismissal for failure to comply. 205
In DeLuna, plaintiff filed a complaint for professional and hospi-
tal negligence arising from the death of plaintiff's decedent follow-
ing surgery. Plaintiff did not attach the written declarations
required under section 2-622 .2o  As a result, the trial court sus-
tained the hospital's and the surgeon's temporally distinct motions
to dismiss, the former dismissal being without prejudice and the
latter with prejudice.20 7
Though numerous state and federal constitutional issues were
raised on appeal, the resolution of two rendered the remaining is-
sues moot. The court first concluded that section 2-622 violates
the separation of powers mandated by article II and section 1 of
article VI of the Illinois Constitution. 20  The court also decided
that it had jurisdiction of an appeal from a dismissal order ex-
pressly made without prejudice and subject to refiling.2°
The court ruled that in enacting section 2-622, the legislature
"overstepped the bounds of constitutional authority" by impermis-
sibly delegating a judicial role to health care professionals, "210
thereby barring a court from exercising its inherent authority to
hear and determine cases. 211 That the section confers a decision-
making, and not merely an advisory, role upon laymen is clear.
First, the section essentially empowers a non-judicial professional
to determine whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case before reaching the courthouse.212 Second, failure to file the
declarations required by the section mandates dismissal, "even
before the judicial process, as we have known it since at least the
203. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-622(a)(1) (1987).
204. Id. para. 2-622(a)(2) and (3).
205. Id. para. 2-622(g). In McCastle v. Sheinkop, 121 Ill. 2d 188, 193, 520 N.E.2d
293, 296 (1987), the supreme court held, following a review of the section's legislative
history, that the legislature had not intended to mandate dismissal with prejudice. This
holding enabled the court to sidestep the constitutional issues that the DeLuna court later
squarely addressed.
206. DeLuna, 184 11. App. 3d at 803, 540 N.E.2d at 848.
207. Id. The trial court did not explain its disparate treatment of the motions to
dismiss. Id.
208. Id. at 810, 540 N.E.2d at 852.
209. Id. at 810-11, 540 N.E.2d at 853.
210. Id. at 810, 540 N.E.2d at 852.
211. Id. at 806, 540 N.E.2d at 850.
212. Id. at 809-10, 540 N.E.2d at 852.
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reign of Henry II, can begin to take its course. ' 213 That the section
bars a court from exercising its exclusive function to hear and de-
cide cases is also clear. The section not only deprives the court of
its role in applying the law to determine the sufficiency of the alle-
gations of a complaint 214 but also deprives it of the opportunity to
consider "important and perhaps even decisive" issues of fact.215
VIII. DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WrrNEssEs
A. Introduction
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule 220216 in 1984 to elim-
inate the delay and prejudice caused by the last-minute disclosure
of trial experts. 2 7 Rule 220 requires that a party disclose the iden-
tity of its testifying expert witness 218 within 90 days after the sub-
stance of the expert's opinion becomes known or at the first pretrial
conference, whichever occurs later.219 The Rule is further struc-
tured to ensure that disclosure of all expert witnesses will occur in
any event at least sixty days before anticipated trial.220 The party
who retains the Rule 220 expert also must pay the fees the expert
213. Id. at 807, 540 N.E.2d at 851. After concluding that section 2-622 was an "all
too disturbingly clear" invasion of the court's constitutional authority, the court went on
to sustain its jurisdiction over the appeal of the dismissal order, which was without preju-
dice to plaintiff's right to refile. Id. at 810-11, 540 N.E.2d at 852-53. The court distin-
guished cases supporting the rule that orders containing "without prejudice" language
are not final and therefore are not appealable. In those cases, unlike the present one, the
right to refile is absolute and unconditional. Such orders cannot ultimately prejudice a
party. Here, plaintiff's right was contingent upon compliance with the unconstitutional
provisions of section 2-622. Had the plaintiff refiled in compliance with section 2-622, he
would have waived his right to have its constitutionality reviewed. The court concluded
that all orders that are "without prej.dice" are not necessarily non-final when the inabil-
ity to appeal the order immediately would prejudice the party against whom it is entered.
Id.
214. Id. at 806, 540 N.E.2d at 850.
215. Id. at 807, 540 N.E.2d at 850. Note that the hospital discharge summary con-
tained defendant-surgeon's clear admission that decedent's death had resulted proxi-
mately from the very surgical acts and omissions the plaintiff alleged. The hospital
record containing the admission would not have been before the court except that plain-
tiff filed it with the memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss. Id. at 805, 540
N.E.2d at 849.
216. ILL. S. CT. R. 220, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 220 (1987).
217. ILL. S. CT. R. 220, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 220, committee comments
at 438 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
218. Rule 220 defines an expert witness as "a person who, because of education,
training or experience, possesses knowledge of a specialized nature beyond that of the
average person on a factual matter material to a claim or defense in pending litigation and
that may be expected to render an opinion within his expertise at trial." ILL. S. CT. R.
220, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220(a)(1) (1987).
219. Id. para. 220(b)(l)(ii).
220. Id.
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charges when, for instance, the opposing party elects to depose
him.22' This requirement contrasts with the general rule that the
party at whose instance a deposition is taken pays the costs
thereof.222
Although the identity of possible expert witnesses was discovera-
ble upon request before the adoption of Rule 220,223 the Rule
places the burden of disclosure and cost on the party employing
the expert. Moreover, the Rule authorizes the imposition of a po-
tentially deadly penalty for non-compliance: the barring of the un-
disclosed expert's testimony at trial.224
B. Treating Physicians
In Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority,2 " the Illinois Supreme
Court held that treating physicians are not Rule 220 experts, and
therefore are exempt from the disclosure and other requirements of
the Rule. The decision resolved two cases that the court had con-
solidated for oral argument and disposition. In both cases, the
plaintiffs had brought personal injury actions against the Chicago
Transit Authority ("CTA").
In the first case, plaintiff had disclosed the identity of his treating
physician during discovery, and defendant had obtained leave of
court to depose him.226 In response to the CTA's Rule 220 re-
quest, plaintiff did not specify that this doctor would testify. Plain-
tiff responded only generally that treating physicians would
testify.227 After the doctor testified at trial over the CTA's objec-
tion, the CTA appealed the $900,000 jury award on the basis, inter
alia, that the trial court should have barred the testimony because
plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 220's disclosure require-
ments. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. The supreme
court also affirmed. 28
The supreme court interpreted Rule 220 to encompass only "liti-
gation-related" witnesses, or those engaged only for the purpose of
giving expert testimony at trial.229 It likened treating physicians to
221. Id. para. 220(c)(6). The Rule provides for an exception when "manifest injustice
would result" from the imposition of this requirement. Id.
222. See id. para. 204(c).
223. See id. para. 201(b) (general discovery provisions).
224. Id. para. 220(b)(1)(ii).
225. 124 Il. 2d 226, 529 N.E.2d 525 (1988).
226. Id. at 231, 529 N.E.2d at 527.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 246, 529 N.E.2d at 534.
229. Id. at 234, 529 N.E.2d at 528. This interpretation rejects the argument that the
words "retained" and "retaining or employing" in the rule could be broadly construed to
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occurrence witnesses. Rule 220 experts develop their opinions
solely in anticipation of testifying at trial, but treating physicians
and occurrence witnesses develop opinions from observing or par-
ticipating in the events that give rise to the litigation. 230 The court
buttressed its interpretation with cases that similarly construe the
comparable provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.231
The court also observed that practicality mandated the conclu-
sion that treating physicians are excluded from the ambit of Rule
220. Neither attorneys nor their clients possess sufficient control
over non-retained witnesses to ensure their cooperation in meeting
the Rule's extensive discovery obligations.232  Additionally, be-
cause the names, records and opinions of treating physicians are
discoverable under other rules, defendants could have prepared for
the possible testimony of the witness in issue.233 Neither defendant
could claim it had suffered the "surprise" that the Rule's adoption
was intended to eliminate.234
The Tzystuck decision suggests a number of problematic is-
sues.235 In Wilson v. CTA, 236 the court split 4 to 3 in holding that a
mean "request." Id. See ILL. S. CT. R. 220(b)(1) and (c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
para. 220(b)(1) and (c) (1987).
230. Id. at 235, 529 N.E.2d at 528-29.
231. Id. at 236, 529 N.E.2d at 529 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), Advisory Com-
mittee Notes (1970 amendment) and cases and other materials which support the inappli-
cability of the federal rule to treating physicians).
232. Id. at 237, 529 N.E.2d at 530. Subsection (c) requires the witness' proponent to
seasonably supplement information furnished under the rule. See ILL. S. Cr. R.
220(c)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 220(c)(3) (1987).
233. 124 Ill. 2d at 238, 529 N.E.2d at 530. The court referred to the general discov-
ery provisions of section 201(b)(1) and to section 204(c), which permits a party to seek
leave of court to depose certain witnesses. See ILL. S. CT. R. 201(b)(l) and 204(c), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 201(b)(1) and 204(c) (1987).
234. The issue in the second case was whether Rule 220 obligates plaintiff to pay the
fees his own treating physician charged for a deposition taken by the CTA. After the
appellate court had denied plaintiff's interlocutory appeal of this certified question, the
supreme court allowed it and reversed. The court held that treating physicians are not
experts within the meaning of Rule 220; therefore, a treating physician's patients are not
responsible under subsection (c) for paying their charges for being deposed. 124 Ill. 2d at
240, 529 N.E.2d at 531.
235. In addition to the Rule 220 problems discussed in the principal text, practition-
ers have raised other Rule 220 questions. For example, must party witnesses be identified
as experts? In commercial litigation, custom and usage often determine whether the par-
ties reached an agreement, whether attempted performance complies with an agreement
and whether there is a breach. Parties may be called to testify as to the existence of
custom and usage. Often, it is not immediately evident that such testimony will be neces-
sary. As a result, the issue of whether such a witness must be identified as an expert
arises very late in the proceedings, with potentially drastic results.
Another problem is exemplified by the 1981 supreme court decision in Wilson v. Clark,
84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981), which permitted an expert to testify without the
introduction into evidence of the basis for his opinion. This situation causes problems
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treating physician who examined the plaintiff for the first time in
three years during a noon recess on the last day of trial neverthe-
less retained his non-expert status.237 Hence, plaintiff's failure to
disclose him did not bar the doctor's post-recess testimony on the
permanence of the plaintiff's injuries. Defendant should have
avoided any surprise the testimony engendered by adequate trial
preparation rather than by reliance on the "protection" of Rule
220.238 Justice Ryan, on behalf of the dissenters, said that even if
treating physicians are not Rule 220 experts, the trial court should
not have allowed this opinion testimony. No amount of trial prep-
aration could avoid the type of surprise that "bushwhacked" this
defendant, and which the trial court had erroneously sanctioned in
Wilson.239
C. Co-workers and Employees
A second issue that the Tzystuck 24 decision arguably affects is
whether coworkers should be subject to the disclosure require-
ments of Rule 220 when they opine at trial about the safety of
conditions or equipment related to the litigation. Although Rule
220 ambiguously provides that such workers "may" be within its
scope,241 the appellate courts disagree as to whether and when to
subject coworkers and employees to the Rule's requirements.242
when new facts are discovered after the witness forms his opinion or when occurrence
witnesses upon whose testimony the expert had relied change their testimony.
Finally, in Cook County, Illinois, Circuit Court Rule 3.3 requires that discovery be
completed within twenty-four months of the complaint's filing date. Thus, expert wit-
nesses must be hired within this period. In reality, the case probably will not be called to
trial for five or more years, so that compliance with the two-year limit results in numer-
ous instances in which the expert originally engaged has died or become unavailable, due
to the passage of time.
236. 126 Ill. 2d 171, 533 N.E.2d 894 (1989).
237. Id. at 176-77, 533 N.E.2d at 897.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 177-78, 533 N.E.2d at 897-98 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
240. Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Auth., 124 Ill. 2d 226, 529 N.E.2d 525 (1988).
241. The Rule's definitional subsection indicates that an expert witness "may be an
employee of a party, a party or an independent contractor." ILL. S. CT. R. 220(a)(1),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 220(a)(1) (1987).
242. Compare Meyer v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 179 Ill. App. 3d 268, 533 N.E.2d 386
(1st Dist. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Ill. 2d 1, 552 N.E.2d 719 (1989) (plaintiff's
failure to disclose identities of five coworkers who offered opinion testimony on the un-
safeness of procedures at defendant's plant necessitated reversal of $900,000 award for
plaintiff) with Voyles v. Sanford, 183 Ill. App. 3d 833, 539 N.E.2d 801 (3d Dist.), appeal
denied, 545 N.E.2d 134 (1989) (allowed testimony of defendant's former employee as to
soundness of trailer's braking system without Rule 220 disclosure). Accord Smith v. Cen-
tral Ill. Pub. Serv., 176 Ill. App. 3d 482, 531 N.E.2d 51 (4th Dist. 1988), appeal denied,
124 Ill. 2d 562, 535 N.E.2d 921 (1989).
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In Meyer v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. ,243 the appellate court re-
versed a $900,000 jury award for the plaintiff because the trial
court had permitted five of plaintiff's coworkers to testify as undis-
closed experts about whether procedures were safe at the plant
where plaintiff was injured. 2"1 The court did not expressly address
plaintiff's argument that, pursuant to Tzystuck,245 coworkers were
like treating physicians because they were not "retained" by the
plaintiff, and because they formed their opinions in the course of
their employment, rather than in anticipation of testifying. The
court concluded, however, that the admission of the testimony
without prior disclosure "was in total disregard of the require-
ments of Supreme Court Rule 220246 and that it placed defend-
ants at a "distinct disadvantage. 247
Meyer presented the Illinois Supreme Court with an opportunity
to resolve the split in authority. The court, however, decided the
case on other grounds and did not address the Rule 220 ques-
tion. 248  At some point, the court will have to reconcile its state-
ment in Tzystuck with the kinds of issues presented in Meyer.
IX. LEGISLATION
A. Changes to the Code of Civil Procedure249
1. Section 2-209: "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction
Section 2-209 of the Code25 ° governs the ability of Illinois courts
to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
Public Acts 85-1156251 and 86-840,232 respectively, make several
changes to the statute. New subsection (a)(6) submits non-resident
parties to actions brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of
1984253 to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts if the party has
performed an act of sexual intercourse within Illinois during the
243. 179 Ill. App. 3d 268, 533 N.E.2d 386 (1st Dist. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
135 Ill. 2d 1, 552 N.E.2d 719 (1990).
244. Id. at 286, 533 N.E.2d at 396.
245. 124 Ill. 2d 226, 529 N.E.2d 525 (1988).
246. 179 Ill. App. 3d at 282, 533 N.E.2d at 395.
247. Id. at 283, 533 N.E.2d at 396.
248. The court concluded that relief was not available under the Structural Work
Act. Meyer, 135 Ill. 2d 1, 552 N.E.2d 719 (1990).
249. Some of the discussed legislation was in process and was signed or became
effective after the Survey period.
250. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209 (1987).
251. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-209 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (effective Janu-
ary 1, 1989).
252. 1989 I11. Legis. Serv. at 4069-70 (West) (effective September 7, 1989).
253. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2501-26 (1987).
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period of conception. Neither the meaning nor the constitutional-
ity of this provision is clear.
Of the several other changes, the most far reaching is subsection
(c). Early decisions under Illinois' long-arm statute held that the
statute was intended to reach all constitutionally permissible out-
of-state service. 254 Later decisions indicated that this was not the
case.25- On September 7, 1989, by an act promoted by Plaintiffs'
Bar, the General Assembly amended section 2-209256 to extend the
applicability of the long-arm statute to its constitutionally permis-
sible limits.
2. Section 2-411: Capacity of Partnerships to Sue
in Their Own Name
Under Illinois common law, a partnership could not sue or be
sued in its own name.257 This rule often caused hardship to plain-
tiffs who could not ascertain who the partners of a partnership
were, or even whether an entity was in fact a partnership. One
remedy was a provision in the Assumed Business Name Act 25 8 that
a partnership which failed to register under the Act could be sued
in its own name.25 9 Another remedy was provided by the amend-
ment of the Illinois Civil Practice Act in 1955 that allowed a part-
nership to be sued in its firm name.2 °
During the last two or three decades, it became apparent that
not allowing a partnership to sue in its own name was an inconve-
nient anachronism, particularly in light of the existence of national
and multi-national partnerships (such as legal and accounting
firms) with hundreds of partners and continuous membership turn-
over. Large partnerships sometimes attempted to evade the section
by the questionable device of nominally assigning the firm's claim
to one of the partners or a third party. The legislative response
was to amend Code section 2-41 1,26 1 effective September 1, 1989,
254. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957) (section 2-
209 "reflect[s] a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the extent permitted by the [federal Constitution's) due process clause.")
255. See, e.g., Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill. 2d 190, 197, 429
N.E.2d 847, 850 (1981) (the boundaries or limits of section 2-209 are not to be equated
with the "minimum contacts" test under the due process clause).
256. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv., P.A. 86-840 at 4070 (West) (effective September 7, 1989).
257. Lewis v. West Side Trust and Savings Bank, 377 Ill. 384, 36 N.E.2d 573 (1941).
258. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96, paras. 4-8(a) (1987).
259. Id. para. 8(a).
260. 1955 Ill. Laws, Section 27.1, p. 2238, § 1 (now section 2-411 of the Code).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-411 (1987).
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to allow partnerships to sue in their own names.262
3. Section 2-402: Expansion of Respondent in Discovery
to All Civil Actions
In 1976, the General Assembly added section 2-402,263 entitled
"Medical Malpractice Respondents in Discovery," to the Code.
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases were often at a loss, prior to
filing suit, as to which of various medical practitioners who had
treated them might have commited the act of malpractice that may
have caused their injuries. In order to avoid the bar of the statute
of limitations, a plaintiff would often sue every medical person or
entity who had given treatment and then dismiss those found upon
discovery to have had no connection with the injury. Section 2-402
was added in response to the complaints of physicians, who rightly
asserted that they were being accused in publicly-filed documents
of malpractice when plaintiffs really had no knowledge as to their
culpability. The provision allows plaintiff a six-month period be-
yond the limitations statute to take discovery against "respondents
in discovery" to determine whether to name them defendants.
The section has permitted plaintiffs to obtain through discovery
the identities of those potentially liable for their damages, while
avoiding the limitations bar and removing any stigma associated
with naming defendants who turn out to be not responsible for the
injuries. It appeared logical to extend this concept to all civil liti-
gation, and the General Assembly now has done so. 26  The
amendment to section 2-402 permits any person or entity in any
civil litigation to be made a respondent in discovery. The amend-
ment should be helpful to plaintiffs and their counsel in avoiding
sanctions under new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137265 for having
made allegations against defendants not reasonably grounded in
fact.2
66
4. Section 2-607: Bills of Particulars
Previously, the demand for a bill of particulars automatically
stayed the time within which the demanding party had to plead,
262. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv., P.A. 86-483 at 2621 (West) (effective September 1, 1989).
263. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-402 (1987).
264. 1989 11. Legis. Serv., P.A. 86-483 at 2620-21 (West) (effective September 1,
1989).
265. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 137).
266. See also infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text (discussion of new Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 224, which, it is hoped, the Illinois courts will construe as a cumula-
tive remedy rather than a remedy inconsistent with amended section 2-402).
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but no time limit was imposed upon the respondent to furnish the
bill. Section 2-607267 of the Code has been amended 268 to alter the
procedure. The statute now requires the respondent to file the bill
within twenty-eight days of the demand's service. If respondent
fails to do so, or furnishes an insufficient bill, the court may, in its
discretion and upon motion, strike the pleading or take other ac-
tion. It should be remembered that bills of particulars are treated
as pleadings, and at least in some instances, a failure to deny mat-
ter set forth in a bill results in an admission of the matter.26 9
5. Section 8-2601: Minors' Out-of-Court Statements
Public Act 85-1440, effective February 1, 1989, adds a new sec-
tion to article VIII of the Code.270 The section governs the admis-
sibility in civil proceedings of out-of-court statements by a child
under thirteen years of age that describe certain unlawful sexual
acts. In order for such declarations to be admissible, the court
must determine, outside the presence of the jury, the reliability of
the declarations, and the declarant child must either testify or be
unavailable as a witness. If the declarant is unavailable, other evi-
dence must corroborate the statement. The new section imposes a
mandatory jury instruction when evidence is admitted and requires
the proponent of the evidence to give reasonable notice to the ad-
verse party of an intention to offer it. This provision may be sub-
ject to serious constitutional objections because the opposing party
does not appear to be afforded the right to confront and cross-
examine.
6. Section 9-111: Condominium Assessment Claims
Prior to its amendment by Public Act 85-1386, section 9-111 of
the Code2 7 ' dealing with the Illinois Condominium Property Act,
had permitted the unrestricted award of reasonable attorney's fees
to condominium associations that obtained judgments for the non-
payment of common area assessments. The amended section 272
subjects the award of fees to the "reasonableness" standards set
267. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-607 (1987).
268. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv., P.A. 86-646 at 3148-50 (West) (effective September 1,
1989).
269. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-607(c) (1987).
270. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-101 through 8-2501 (1987) (civil evidence
rules).
271. Id. para. 9-111 (1987).
272. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-111 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (effective Janu-
ary 1, 1989).
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forth in new subsection (b). The subsection essentially directs the
courts to consider the reasonableness of the amount claimed for
legal fees in light of the amount in controversy and the nature of
the lawsuit.
7. Section 12-101: Judgment Liens
Section 12-101273 governs generally the creation of liens against
real property by the recording of judgments in the county in which
the debtor's property is located. When a judgment for child sup-
port gives rise to a lien and the debtor has satisfied the judgment,
the section permits the debtor to effectuate the release of the lien by
serving notice of and recording an affidavit to that effect. New sub-
section (d)274 clarifies that the debtor's affidavit operates to release
the lien only if the judgment creditor files no affidavit objecting
thereto within twenty-eight days of receiving the prescribed notice.
8. Section 15-1507: Foreclosure Sales
Public Act 85-1298 enacts a small but significant change to the
notice requirements for judicial foreclosure sales. 275 Notices of
sales must be advertised separately in the legal notice and real es-
tate sections of publications that are circulated to the general pub-
lic in the county in which the property is located.276 The section
previously permitted the two advertisements to be published in the
same newspaper. The amendment requires publication of each no-
tice in a different newspaper in counties whose population exceeds
three million.277
B. Changes to the Supreme Court Rules
1. Rule 3: Rules Committee Practice & Procedure
New Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3,278 provides for the creation
by the Illinois Supreme Court of a committee to receive, assess and
conduct hearings on suggestions and proposed rule changes in all
areas of the Illinois courts' practice and procedure.
273. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-101 (1987).
274. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-101(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (effective
January 1, 1989).
275. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1507 (1987).
276. Id.
277. At present, the amendment implicates only Cook County, Illinois property.
278. ILL. S. CT. R. 3, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)
(effective January 1, 1989).
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2. Rule 23: Disposition of Appellate Cases
Rule 23279 was amended to provide a procedure pursuant to
which parties may request an appellate panel to change the
designation of its decision from an unpublished order to a pub-
lished opinion.28°
3. Rule 105: Additional Relief Against Defaulted Parties
Amended Rule 105(b),28' effective January 1, 1989, clarifies the
permissible methods by which notice can be served on parties when
additional relief is sought against them after they are held to be in
default. The Rule formerly required restricted delivery of all no-
tices when served by certified or registered mail. The amendment
limits the requirement of restricted delivery to instances of service
upon "natural persons." To prove service of notice on other enti-
ties, a showing of merely to whom and when the notice was deliv-
ered suffices.
4. Rule 137: Sanctions for Bad-Faith Filings
As previously discussed,282 new Rule 137283 preempts section 2-
611 of the Code.284 The Rule became effective on August 1, 1989.
5. Rule 201: Discovery
Rule 20125 was amended by the addition of paragraph (m). The
amendment allows the circuit courts to prohibit or otherwise regu-
late the filing of discovery materials by local rule.286 This Rule will
ease the burden on court clerks of receiving and retaining volumi-
nous discovery materials, such as deposition transcripts.
279. ILL. S. CT. R. 23, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)
(effective January 1, 1989).
280. For an extended discussion of the impact of publication upon legal precedent
and courts' workloads, see Beyler, Selective Publication: An Empirical Study, 21 Loy.
CHI. L.J. 1 (1989).
281. ILL. S. CT. R. 105(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 105(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989) (effective January 1, 1989).
282. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 137 and section
2-611).
283. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective Au-
gust 1, 1989).
284. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
285. ILL. S. CT. R. 201, 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective Au-
gust 1, 1989).
286. Id. The rule essentially permits the circuit courts to follow the procedure
adopted by the Northern District of Illinois. See Rule 18 of the General Rules of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (prohibiting the filing of
discovery materials absent court order).
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6. Rule 204(c): Depositions of Physicians
Prior to January 1, 1989, the effective date of the amendment to
Rule 204(c), 2 7 doctors who were not subject to the expert witness
requirements of supreme court Rule 220288 could be deposed only
upon order of court or the doctor's consent. Following the amend-
ment, a physician's deposition may proceed without a court order
only if the deponent consents and the parties agree to the taking of
the deposition.
7. Rule 224: Pre-Suit Discovery
New Rule 22429 affords a device in addition to the expansion by
the General Assembly of the "respondent in discovery" mecha-
nism of section 2-402 of the Code2 1 for ascertaining the identity of
possible defendants and obtaining facts upon which to buttress al-
legations in a complaint. The Rule requires that a petition be filed
stating the reason why the proposed discovery is necessary and the
nature of the discovery sought. The Rule provides that the court
order allowing the discovery "will limit discovery to the identifica-
tion of responsible persons and entities . . ." The question of iden-
tification of who is responsible is often interwoven with the facts of
the transaction, however, and it remains to be seen how much lati-
tude the courts will give to a potential plaintiff.
8. Rule 296: Enforcement of Support Orders
New Rule 296,291 provides comprehensive rules, definitions,
forms and punishment for the circuit court clerks' enforcement of
child support orders entered pursuant to the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution Act2 92 and related acts.
287. ILL. S. CT. R. 204(c), 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective
August 1, 1989).
288. ILL. S. CT. R. 220, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 220 (1987). See supra notes
225-39 and accompanying text (discussion of treating physicians as expert witnesses).
289. ILL. S. CT. R. 224, 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective Au-
gust 1, 1989).
290. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-402 (1987). For a discussion of amended sec-
tion 2-402, see supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
291. ILL. S. CT. R. 296, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 296 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989) (effective February 1, 1989).
292. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 101 (1987).
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9. Rule 304(a): Appeals of Final Judgments that Do Not
Dispose of Entire Proceedings
As the committee comments to amended Rule 304(a)293 explain,
the amendment was promulgated to remedy the situation created
by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Elg v. Whittington.294
The Elg decision held that the filing of a post-trial motion on a
final judgment that disposes of less than all of the claims among
the parties, wherein a Rule 304(a) finding that there is no just rea-
son for the delay of enforcement or appeal has been included, does
not toll the time within which a notice of appeal can be filed. The
amendment gives the same effect to a post-trial motion in a Rule
304(a) case as Rule 303295 gives to a post-trial motion in a case that
disposes of all claims among the parties: the time to appeal runs
from the date of ruling on the post-trial motion.
10. Rule 307: Interlocutory Appeals as of Right
Rule 307 adds to the category of interlocutory orders that may
be appealed as a matter of right by including those "terminating
parental rights or granting, denying or revoking temporary com-
mitment in adoption cases. "296 The procedure with respect to the
appeal of temporary restraining orders also is altered by requiring,
in addition to the notice of appeal, a written petition filed within
two days of the entry or denial of the restraining order sought.
The petition must state the grounds upon which it is based and the
relief requested, and must be accompanied by the record. Both
parties may file a memorandum, not exceeding fifteen pages, within
two days of the filing of the petition. The appellate court then de-
cides the case within two days, but retains authority to change the
rules in various ways if it chooses.
11. Rule 310: Appellate Prehearing Conferences
Prior to the August 1, 1989 amendment of Rule 3 10,297 an appel-
late judge who presided at a prehearing conference of a case could
not participate in the subsequent decision. The potentially prob-
lematic amendment permits a prehearing judge also to participate
293. ILL. S. CT. R. 304(a), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 304(a), committee com-
ments (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
294. 119 Ill. 2d 844, 518 N.E.2d 1232 (1987).
295. ILL. S. CT. R. 303, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1l0A, para. 303 (1987).
296. ILL. S. CT. R. 307, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 307 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989).
297. ILL. S. CT. R. 310, 1989 Il1. Legis. Serv. No. 2, appendix (West) (effective Au-
gust 1, 1989).
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in the decision if the parties agree to this dual function. Realities
may impose pressure upon parties to agree to the dual-role ar-
rangement in which the prehearing judge is likely to learn of mat-
ters and to form impressions not contained in the record on appeal.
12. Rule 375: Sanctions for Bad Faith Appellate Filings
New Rule 375298 provides for the appellate court's imposition of
sanctions for willful failure to comply with appellate rules and for
the prosecution of frivolous appeals.299
X. CONCLUSION
The authors hope that the foregoing summary of another active
year in numerous areas of civil procedure will be a useful tool, in-
forming the bar of significant developments and providing an effec-
tive resource for problems on the cutting edge of the development
of the law.
298. Id. para. 375.
299. New Rule 375 is more fully discussed supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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